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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the 2% of GDP allocation 
on Defense expenditures has on the NATO member states that have assumed this commitment. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: In terms of national defense industries two aspects must be 
taken into consideration. Employment is the first considered, as a functioning defense industry, 
be it through partnerships, off-set or just internal production would decrease unemployment 
and have a positive impact on economic growth. The second argument is that of imports and 
exports of armament that have increases since countries have been required not only to jump 
to 2% in terms of defense expenditures 
Findings: The empirical results show that before for member states correlation exists and 
positive effects on imports and exports can be observed, while for non-NATO countries that 
are in different partnerships in terms of security and defense with the United States, there seem 
to be a mixture of effects on different categories of economic activities.  
Practical Implications: It is the aim of this paper to show whether the 2% of the GDP 
allocation should be continued to all NATO member states that have yet to commit to this 
effort. So far findings indicate, that while results are not always positive, key advantages can 
be observed by applying this strategy, rather than not going forward with the commitment. 
Originality/value: Investing in defense and security is an innovative approach now that the 
EU on its own is considering requesting special allocation on the Common Defense and 
Security Policy for member states. It is therefore worth analyzing if investments already 
requested by NATO are feasible and whether duplicating efforts might or might not appear 
when both NATO and EU ask member states to contribute more to defense expenditures. 
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Defense expenditures have been studied over the years specialized literature. The 
correlation has been presented either for a group of states5 or for individual states6. 
While older paper7s show that defense expenditures can have different trends, either 
positive or negative in terms of impact on economic growth, recent papers tend to 
establish through econometrical models that in most cases, the effects of defense 
expenditures are negative when correlated with economic growth. Conventionally it 
is believed that defense expenditure is inversely related to economic development due 
to its high opportunity cost in term of forgone productive expenditure. Endogenous 
growth theories suggest that government expenditure has an important impact on the 
long-run growth rate. Its influence depends on the size of government intervention 
and on the different components of public spending. Moreover, different kinds of 
government expenditures have heterogeneous effects on economic growth. 
 
The same analysis that applies to the choice between military goods and civilian goods 
can also be applied to the choice between production for current consumption and 
production for future consumption. Criticism of defense expenditures has therefore 
created the term guns and butter, to make possible the analysis of the opportunity cost 
that civilian goods and military goods would bring to the table. 8Defense spending 
cannot contribute to a nation's ability to produce more economic goods and services 
in the future. More public expenditure in the military sector leads to crowding out of 
private investment and less investment on public goods like health, education, and 
scientific research. Thus, from both the short-run and the long-run points of view a 
decline in military spending will attain the primary objective of development, that is, 
to benefit people. A possible beneficial effed of defense expenditure lies in its role in 
creating effective demand when there is slack in the economy. Within the Keynesian 
framework of macroeconomic analysis, government expenditure on goods and 
services including defense is an important force in the determination of output and 
employment. From this perspective, military spending or any other form of 
government spending has the potential of achieving full employment output.  
 
Defense expenditures have become a subject of even more attention ever since the 
NATO Wales Summit in 2014. The 2014 NATO Wales Summit discussed Russia, 
Ukraine, Iraq, defense spending amongst allies and the end of combat operations in 
Afghanistan. 
 
5Korkmaz, The Effect of Military Spending on Economic Growth and Unemployment in 
Mediterranean Countries, 2015. 
6Obreja, The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth, 2010. 
7Robert, Alexander, The impact of defence spending on economic growth, 2007. 
8Amjad, Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth: Time Series Evidence from 
Pakistan Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth: Time Series Evidence from 
Pakistan, 2014. 
 




Allies adopted a Readiness Action Plan to strengthen NATO’s collective defense. 
Primarily geared towards the Eastern part of the Alliance, this includes plans to 
establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force that can deploy within a few days, 
and an enhanced military presence involving exercises and a continued military 
presence on a rotational basis. Following the Crimean Crisis, NATO member states 
came to an agreement in 2014 to increase their expenditures to 2% of the GDP. Even 
more, to make sure that these expenditures are directed towards deterrence and 
developing national defense capabilities, member states agreed in the same summit 
that from this 2%, a minimum of 20% of the budget would be spent on procurement 
of defense equipment.  
 
These two commitments changed the perspective on defense. Some countries 
immediately jumped to the 2% expenditures while other refused, while making the 
increase in defense expenditures a long-term commitment not a short term one. A 
picture of how defense expenditures looked in 2017-2018 can be observed in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1. Defense Expenditures as part of GDP projections for 2017-2018. 
 
Source: World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS 
 
Some countries have considered that the 2% increase might represent a problem for 
other economic indicators and therefore have postponed this increase in expenditures. 
Although the 2% benchmark may serve as a simple indication of political commitment 
and alliance solidarity, there are a few reasons not to be satisfied with this metric. For 
one thing, it does not work well in comparison. A dollar spent on defense in Europe 
does not go as far as it might in other cases, so purchasing-power difference also must 
be considered when making comparisons with a country like China.  
 
Another point of difference is to do with the scope of strategic commitments – unlike 
Americans, Europeans do not maintain a far-flung network of bases supporting a 
global alliances system. 
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However, the main weakness of the 2% metric is that cost does not equal value. 
Depending on the proportion of a defense budget dedicated to salaries, benefits and 
pensions, the bulk of spending could go on personnel, and say little about combat 
power or readiness to deploy and fight away from home borders. Large but static 
armies may pass the test in terms of cost but would fail against numerically smaller 
forces equipped with superior information technology, faster vehicles and next-
generation weapons. The emerging military potential of new technology (e.g. 
robotics, artificial intelligence) is re-directing attention on how much spending needs 
to be diverted towards military research and development. 
 
In Figure 2 the list of NATO member states that have reached the 2% indicator in 
2018 can be observed with just countries like US, Greece, Estonia and UK being over 
the requirement, while countries like Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Romania almost 
reaching the 2% mark. 
 
Figure 2. Share of GDP, 2018. 
 
 
Source: NATO, IISSS Military Balance. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that expenditures on defense has a negative or positive 
impact on defense we have chosen to observe a larger group of countries, not just 
NATO countries, to try and see if the type of partnerships these countries share in 
terms of defense alliances would also share a role in affecting economic growth. 




2. Partnerships and Alliances within NATO and the United States 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to analyze the impact of defense 
expenditures on a larger number of variables in the model in chapter III we have 
selected different partnerships that the US and NATO has realized in terms of Defense.  
 
The first group analyzed will be that of member states of NATO that have or have not 
increased their defense expenditures to 2%. In its current form, NATO has no less 
than 29 member states in its organization.  
 
The second group studied will be that of The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) 
which is an initiative launched during NATO's 2004 Istanbul summit. 
 
During this summit, NATO leaders decided to elevate the Alliance’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue to a genuine partnership and to launch the ICI with selected countries in the 
broader region of the Middle East. The initiative is an offer to engage in practical 
security cooperation activities with states throughout the Greater Middle East. This 
new initiative stands alongside NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and the 
Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO itself regards these security cooperation partnerships 
as a response to the new challenges of the 21st century and as a complement to the G8 
and U.S.-EU decisions to support calls for reform from within the Broader Middle 
East region. The ICI comprises just 4 states: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United 
Arab Emirates 
 
Another group is that of the Mediterranean Dialogue, first launched in 1994, is a forum 
of cooperation between NATO and seven countries of the Mediterranean. Its stated 
aim is to create good relations and better mutual understanding and confidence 
throughout the region, promoting regional security and stability and explaining 
NATO's policies and goals.   
 
The Dialogue reflects NATO's view that security in Europe is tied to the security and 
stability in the Mediterranean. It also reinforces and complements the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe's Mediterranean Initiative. 
 
The last group studied in the analysis is that of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC), a post-Cold War NATO institution, is a multilateral forum created 
to improve relations between NATO and non-NATO countries in Europe and those 
parts of Asia on the European periphery. States meet to cooperate and go to the range 
of political and security issues. It was formed on May 29, 1997 in the ministers 
meeting of Sintra, Portugal, as the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC), which was created in 1991. It works alongside the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), created in 1994. It comprises 21 states, most of which are former 
communist countries that have joined the treaty after 1990, like Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
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Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, former Yugoslavian Republics like Serbia, 
Bosnia and Hercegovina,  as well as countries that are not part of NATO, but are 
European Union members like Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Malta and Austria. 
 
3. Methodology and Variables 
 
For the groups of countries chosen as samples for the models, we will use the SIPRI 
Milex database for defense expenditures data, SIPRI Trend Indicator for Export and 
Imports on armaments, as well as the World Bank data base regarding other variables 
such as unemployment and public debt. To have relevant data in our analysis we have 
grouped the countries into three groups: NATO Countries, NON-NATO Countries 
and Partnership for Peace Countries. 
 
We have chosen these variables taking into consideration the fact that previous papers 
have shown that although usually defense expenditures have a negative impact on 
economic growth, a positive effect could still be observed in terms of the national 
defense industry of the countries studies. In terms of national defense industries two 
aspects must be taken into consideration. Employment is the first considered, as a 
functioning defense industry, be it through partnerships, off-set or just internal 
production would decrease unemployment and have a positive impact on economic 
growth. The second argument is that of imports and exports of armament that have 
increases since countries have been required not only to jump to 2% in terms of 
defense expenditures, but also to assure at least 20% of the budget to procurement of 
military equipment. For the following model we are going to use the following 
variables (Table 1): 
 
Table 1. Research variables 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
Unemployment Exports of Armaments 
Economic Growth Public Debt 
Defense expenditures as 
part of GDP 
Imports 
Exports 
Imports of armament 
Source: Own study.  
      
4. Testing and Results 
 
For the following chapter we have tried to understand the impact that some economic 
indicators like exports, imports, economic growth, and unemployment have when 
correlated with exports of armaments. For model 1 we have chosen the exports of 
armaments as a dependent variable, because for NATO countries the increase of 2% 
in the GDP for Defense Expenditures has meant an increase in exports and imports of 
military equipment, starting with the year 2014. For Model 2 we have used economic 




growth as our dependent variable, as it was the aim of the paper to identify the impact 
that defense expenditures and correlated indicators have on the GDP. 
 
In the following graphs (Figures 4 and 5) the difference between NATO and Non-
NATO countries can be seen in terms of their policies towards armaments imports. 
This is natural as the NATO countries are strictly following their commitment 
following the Wales Summit in 2014. 
 
Figure 4. NATO countries 
 
Source: Own study.  
 
Figure 5. Non-NATO Countries 
 
Source: Own study.  
 
To examine the correlates of arms exports in our group of countries, the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator is used. This method estimates the 
structure of heteroskedasticity from the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and also allows 
designing a consistent estimator of the errors’ covariance matrix based on residuals. 
Even though it is not always consistent, the FGLS is preferred over OLS under 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, especially when dealing with large samples. 
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In Table 2 below, we use a simple FGLS model to explain the impact of several 
potential explanatory variables on arms exports. Different models (Models 1-3) are 
separately built for three distinct groups of countries. According to the models’ 
estimates, higher arms imports are positively correlated to higher arms exports and to 
a lower public debt. The total exports and imports carry different effects across the 
NATO and non-NATO countries. For instance, higher imports are associated to higher 
arms exports in the Non-NATO countries, and to lower arms exports in the NATO 
countries. In turn, the total exports could be a determinant of arms exports only in the 
NATO countries (which also reflect in Model 1 which includes all countries). 
 










Arms imports 0.69*** (0.22) 0.63*** (0.18) 1.45*** (0.47) 
Total exports 0.0035*** (0.0002) 0.0043*** (0.0001) 0.00005 (0.001) 
Total imports 0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0005** (0.0002) 0.0084*** (0.0011) 
Public debt -13.97*** (1.95) -5.07*** (1.7) -15.65*** (3.87) 
Note: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression, 167 observations. 
Source: Own study. 
 
In Table 3, the same models as in Table 2 are run, but this time by considering the 
heteroskedasticity (Models 1H-3H). The estimates are much lower than in Table 2, 
but in general lines they reflect the same empirical findings.  
 











Arms imports 0.24*** (0.09) 0.21* (0.10) 0.57*** (0.20) 
Total exports 0.0025*** (0.0002) 0.0029*** (0.0002) 0.0003 (0.007) 
Total imports 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0022*** (0.0008) 
Public debt -6.46*** (0.68) -5.11*** (1.15) -5.40*** (1.60) 
Note: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression, with correction for heteroskedasticity 167 
observations. 
Source: Own study. 
 
To sum up the findings derived from Table 2 and Table 3 a higher public debt is 
strongly and significantly associated to a lower amount of arms exports, while higher 
arms imports tend to be associated to higher arms exports. Given that in the empirical 
section we operate with a restrained number of variables, before to run the quantitative 
analysis, we briefly discuss the correlations between our variables, upon different 
groups of countries. 
 




First, when comparatively examining the NATO and non-NATO groups of countries, 
we notice a much higher correlation among all variables for the NATO countries, and 
much lower and even negative correlations between the non-NATO countries. This is 
according to our expectations and it suggests the common policy framework 
implemented at the level of NATO countries. The testing of correlation for model 1 
can be observed in Table 4: 
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients, NATO countries Correlations coefficients, Non-
NATO countries 










ARMS EXPORTS 1     
TOTAL EXPORTS 0.91 1    
ARMS IMPORTS 0.43 0.38 1   
TOTAL IMPORTS 0.71 0.83 0.23 1  
PUBLIC DEBT 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.35 1 
Source: Own study. 
 
According to the models’ estimates, higher GDP is positively associated to higher 
defense expenditures, higher arms exports and total exports, and there is no significant 
correlation to the public debt. The arms exports carry different effects across the 
NATO, non-NATO and PfP countries. (No reference above???) For instance, higher 
defense expenditures are associated to higher arms exports in NATO and non-NATO 
countries in general, but not in the case of PfP countries. Total exports have a positive 
correlation with the defense expenditures for all the countries analyzed (Table 5): 
 




























Total exports 2.83*** (0.09) 1.89*** (0.14) 2.86*** 
(0.094) 
2.71*** (0.11) 







Note: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression, 167 observations 
Source: Own study. 
 
In Table 6, the explanatory variables analyzed were defense expenditures, arms 
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Table 6. Correlates of GDP    
Explanatory 
variables 
NATO countries Non-NATO 
countries 
PFP countries 
Defense expenditures 20.33*** (0.79) 24.66*** (1.29) 33.95*** (2.06) 
Arms imports 417.05* (159.74) -46.00** (23.12) -17.71* (150.83) 
Public debt 3059.13* 
(1734.24) 
148.38* (252.90) 632.15* 
(737.31) 
Note: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with a correction for heteroskedasticity, 
167 observations 
Source: Own study. 
 
According to the models estimates, higher GDP is overall positively associated to 
higher defense expenditures across all countries analyzed, while higher defense 
expenditures do not have a significant correlation to higher arms imports for the 
NATO countries. For the Non-NATO outside of PfP and PfP member countries, 
higher defense expenditures have a negative association to arms imports. Public debt 
does not appear to have an association to higher defense expenditures nor arms 
imports, in any of the countries analyzed.  
 
Given that in the empirical section we operate with a restrained number of variables, 
before to run the quantitative analysis, we briefly discuss the correlations between our 
variables, upon different groups of countries. 
 
To sum up the findings derived from Table 1 and Table 2, higher defense expenditures 
are not significantly associated to higher public debt in the countries analyzed. 
Considering that many of the NATO members are also members of the EU and have 
to comply with public debt limits set in the Maastricht Treaty, the findings are 
consistent with the measures taken by these countries to keep the public debt under 
control. Higher defense expenditures because of NATO requests do not have an 
influence on this indicator for NATO countries. The non-NATO countries do not have 
to comply with the 2% of GDP for defense expenditures mark, so their defense 
expenditures do not show a correlation with the public debt.   
 
The correlation between higher defense expenditures and higher arms imports in 
NATO countries is not a significant one, and it appears that for the time analyzed 
higher defense expenditures have not materialized in higher arms imports. The 
findings are not surprising, considering that, although the 2% of GDP mark has been 
in place in NATO for many years, there were no incentives or coercive measures to 
increase the defense expenditures. The situation has changed only starting with 2015, 
as new threats have emerged for the NATO countries. When comparatively examining 
the NATO and non-NATO groups of countries, we notice a much higher correlation 
among all variables for the NATO countries, and much lower and even negative 
correlations between the non-NATO countries. This is according to our expectations 
and it suggests the common policy framework implemented at the level of NATO 
countries. 






The correlation between higher defense expenditures and higher arms imports in 
NATO countries is not a significant one, and it appears that for the time period 
analyzed higher defense expenditures have not materialized in higher arms imports. 
The findings are not surprising, considering that, although the 2% of GDP mark has 
been in place in NATO for many years, there were no incentives or coercive measures 
to increase the defense expenditures. The situation has changed only starting with 
2015, as new threats have emerged for the NATO countries and following the policy 
of Donald Trump to pressure the European NATO members to increase their defense 
expenditures.  
 
The real issue is what an “adequate” amount of military spending really is, given that 
every extra dollar spent above the necessary level is a clear loss for the economy. This 
principle comes from the so-called Guns and Butter Effect, whereby analyzing 
marginally it is evident that for every increase in defense expenditures, other 
expenditures in the public sector will be affected. In a democracy, this issues of the 
Guns and Butter Effect is debated by publicly elected officials and changes year to 
year. For example, military spending in the US has been declining as military 
engagements abroad wrap up. In non-democratic nations, however, the level of 
adequate spending is decided by a select few and may come at even a greater cost to 




Amjad, A., Muhamed, A. 2014. Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic  
Growth: Time Series, Evidence from Pakistan. Global Journal of 
Management and Business Research:   Economics and Commerce, 14, 9, 
Version 1.0. 
Dumitrache, V. 2019. The Difference between Allocation and Expenditures inside  
the PPBEES Model, Regional Department of Defense Resources 
Management Studies, Conference Book, 85-91. 
Gheorghe, S. 2019. The Role of the EU and NATO in Providing European Defense  
and Security. Complementarity or Competition, Regional Department of 
Defense Resources Management Studies, Conference Book, 231-244. 
Heo, U. 2010. The Relationship between Defense Spending and Economic Growth  
in the United States, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, 760-770. 
Korkmaz, S. 2015. The Effect of Military Spending on Economic Growth and  
Unemployment in Mediterranean Countries, International Journal of 
Economics and Financial Issues, Vol. 5, No. 1, 273-280.  
North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2018. The International Institute for Strategic  
Studies. The Military Balance 2018, Chapter Two, Comparative Defense 
Statistics, 19-26. 
Obreja, L. 2010. The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth. Journal  
      Vlad Dumitrache, Florin Eduard Grosaru, Maria Constantinescu, Monica Szeles 
    
 415  
 
for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(4), 
148-167. 
Robert, W., Alexander, J. 2007. The impact of defense spending on economic  
 Growth. Journal of Defense Economics, Vol 2, 39-55.  
Strambeanu, L. 2019. Enhancing National Defense Planning, Regional Department  
of Defense Resources Management Studies, Conference Book, 252-259. 
Data World Bank indicators, 1960-2018. 
 
 
  
